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RECENT DECISIONS
Attorney-Client: Attorney Disciplined For Extra-professional
Conduct-After defendant failed to file state income tax returns
for two consecutive years, he was tried and convicted under section
71.11(42) of the Wisconsin Statutes. The Board of State Bar Commis-
sioners then brought the instant action seeking disciplinary action by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. A court appointed referee found no
actual criminal intent, fraud or moral turpitude and recommended dis-
missal of the action. Disregarding this recommendation the court af-
firmed the referee's findings but held that the attorney's conduct war-
ranted a reprimand and ordered defendant to pay costs and expenses of
the proceeding not exceeding $750.1
In its per curiam opinion the court specifically overruled the previ-
ous Wisconsin law in this area as contained in State v. McKilnon.2
Defendant's conduct may show an inexcusable lack of moral
sense regarding the discharge of his obligations as a private citi-
zen to his government, but it is not within the scope of this
court's authority to impose a discipline for conduct which has
no relation to his duties and obligations as a lawyer, where the
request for disciplinary action is based upon acts involving no
moral turpitude.3
The Wisconsin court has defined moral turpitude as follows:
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and cus-
tomary rule of right and duty between man and man.4
There appears to be a general trend toward the expansion of the
attorney's standard of conduct, violation of which is punishable.5 The
general rule is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
Attorneys, in performance of the obligations and duties as-
sumed, must conform to certain standards in relation to their
clients, to the court, to the profession and to the public, and an
attorney can be deprived of his rights as an attorney by the
judgement of the court for moral or professional delinquency.
While a license to engage in the practice of law will not be re-
voked for trivial causes, impropriety, or breaches of good taste,
discipline for misconduct is not limited to cases where the attor-
ney's acts are infamous or of a gross or serious nature, and the
I State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis.2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963).
2263 Wis. 413, 57 N.W.2d 404 (1953).
3 Id. at 416-417, 57 N.W.2d at 406.
4 State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 249, 38 N.W.2d 679, 687 (1949).
5 Helm, Disciplining the Attorney for Extra-Professional Conduct, 12 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 487 (1961).
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courts will ordinarily discipline for offenses involving moral
turpitude.6
Expansion of the general rule has taken the form of enlargement of
the definition of "moral turpitude" or substitution of a different test
for evaluation of the lawyer's alleged misconduct.7 The Wisconsin court
has commendably refused to tamper with the definition of "moral turpi-
tude" but in deciding this case has not laid down any firm test that may
be applied to questionable conduct. In holding defendant subject to
censure and discipline the court quoted from Canon 32 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association," "He (the
lawyer) must also observe and advise his client to observe the statute
law ..... " and stated:
The intentional violation of the tax laws is also a violation of
Canon 32. . . . Governments cannot operate effectively unless
their revenue laws are obeyed. Such a violation of the tax laws
by an attorney is a matter of serious concern because he neces-
sarily must advise his clients with respect to their obeyance of
such laws .... The intentional failure to file income tax returns
evinces an attitude on the part of the attorney of placing himself
above the law. Such an attitude does not befit a lawyer...
We do not wish to imply that every violation of law by an
attorney will subject him to discipline. As a general rule, before
such violation will be a ground for discipline it must entail moral
turpitude.... Nevertheless, we deem intentional violation of the
tax laws, even though without intent to defraud the government,
an exception to this general rule because in our opinion such
intentional violation constitutes unprofessional conduct."9 (Italics
supplied.)
Thus, apparently those violations of statute law which are intentional
and, in the opinion of the supreme court, unprofessional conduct sub-
ject the attorney to discipline. Such unprofessional conduct is that atti-
tude which does not befit a lawyer. This type of test would require a
court decision for each new fact situation for it appears impossible to
establish generally what attitudes do not befit a lawyer.
With the increased control being placed on the attorney by the
supreme court and the existence of the integrated bar, this case and its
rule places the attorney in the very precarious position of having to
6 7 CJ.S. Attorney & Client §19 (1937).
7 Helm, supra note 5.
8 Rule 9 of the Rules of the State Bar of Wisconsin states: "The rules of
professional conduct set forth from time to time in the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics of the American Bar Association, as supplemented or modified
by pronouncements of the court, shall be the standards governing the prac-
tice of law in this state."
9 State v. Roggensack, supra note 1, at 45-46, 119 N.W.2d at 416-417. In a case
handed down at the same time, the Wisconsin court suspended an attorney's
license for two years after defendant was found guilty of filing false and
fraudulent returns. State v. Cain, 19 Wis.2d 50, 119 N.W.2d 391 (1963).
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guess when a statutory violation might result in censure, In other juris-
dictions putting slugs in a parking meter,'0 writing checks without
funds,"' and being negligent in providing for safety of patrons in a
night club'12 were found grounds for disbarment. Perhaps in Wisconsin
a traffic violation or poker playing in the basement might have the same
effect.
The majority of the court did not mention Wisconsin Statute, sec-
tion 256.28, which has been interpreted as follows:
. * . Under sec. 256.28 a lawyer found guilty of unprofes-
sional conduct or an act involving moral turpitude may be sus-
pended or disbarred from practice but no other penalty is pro-
vided.13
It would seem relatively easy for the court to construe this statute
as permissive and not restrictive, therefore allowing the discipline to be
other than suspension or revocation of defendant's bar license. Such
an interpretation would avoid the questioning of the court's authority
to discipline outside the statute, such authority being described in Jus-
tice Hallows' dissent as "a dangerous doctrine of inherent power."'14
The oft reiterated test of whether there is a likelihood, if discipline is
imposed short of suspension or disbarment, of the attorney engaging in
future unprofessional conduct could then be applied to ascertain the
form of discipline.
Defendant, besides pleading illness, overwork and a failure of his
accounting system, alleges:
Defendant was never aware that his delay constitutes criminal
conduct; indeed, at the time he failed to timely file, no individual
in the State of Wisconsin had ever been subjected to criminal
prosecution, although the statute had been in existence almost
fifty years.' 5
Being an attorney, defendant had all the more reason to know the
law and now use of the statute in question does not reflect on its use in
this case. The court seems to have the correct object in mind but its
approach is tedious. Such problems will always cause difficulty in rea-
soning to a result which seems unanimously desirable. As another writer
has pointed out:
Courts have not always concerned themselves with making a
characterization as to moral turpitude with regard to the conduct
of an attorney convicted of evasion of federal income taxes.
[Evasion of federal income taxes is not considered as a criminal
10 Fellner J. Bar Association, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
11 State v. Mannix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 507, 290 Pac. 745 (1930).
12 In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946).
13 State v. McCarthy, supra note 4, at 246, 38 N.W.2d at 685.
1 State v. Roggensack, supra note 1, at 49, 119 N.W.2d at 418-419.
15 Brief for Defendant, p. 6, State v. Roggensack, supra note 1.
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charge involving moral turpitude because the majority of the
courts do not consider fraud an element of the charge.]1 They
have sometimes approached the problem as being one of whether
there had been conduct below the level of behavior of attorneys
and, if so, to what extent, for the purpose of determining the
gravity of the punishment.17 (Material in parentheses has been
added.)
STEPHEN F. SCHREITER
Attorney-Client: Compensation of an Attorney Appointed to
Defend an Indigent-Appellant, an attorney, was assigned by the
circuit court to defend one of three indigents charged with the murder
of a Wisconsin law enforcement officer. The jury trial of these three
Illinois residents, after a change of venue, consumed thirty-nine and
one-half days and resulted in the conviction of all three and sentences
of life imprisonment. After the trial, appellant applied to the court for
allowance of attorney fees and disbursements in the amount of
$18,486.55. This amount included $10,556.30 for services rendered
prior to the trial, $6,810.00 for services rendered during the trial and
$1,120.25 for disbursements. It was computed at $100 per day in trial
and $15 per hour in preparation. The circuit court refused to pay the
full amount requested on the grounds that the trial was unnecessarily
protracted and the amount of time spent in preparation was not reason-
ably necessary. The trial court allowed appellant a total of $6,500 with-
out specifying how the amount was computed according to the various
services rendered and the disbursements. On the attorney's appeal from
the order, the supreme court awarded $1,120.25 for expenses in addi-
tion to the $6,500 awarded by the trial court.:
This case presented the supreme court with the problem of inter-
preting section 957.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes as it was amended by
Chapter 500 of the Laws of 1961. This statute provides for compensa-
tion for an attorney assigned to represent an indigent charged with any
felony. The amendment to the statute eliminated provisions for fixed
fees2 and directed that compensation be made "pursuant to §256.49,"
which provides that when any attorney has been appointed by a court,
the court shall
... fix the amount of his compensation for the services and pro-
vide for the repayment of disbursements in such sum as the
16 47 KY.L.J. 256 (1959).
37 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1398 (1958).
I Conway v. Sauk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 120 N.W. 2d 671 (1963).2
"The county shall pay the attorney so appointed such sum as the court shall
order as compensation and expenses, not exceeding $25 for each half day in
court, $15 for each half day of preparation not exceeding 5 days, $15 for
each half day attending at the taking of depositions . . ." Wis. STAT. §957.26
(1959).
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